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A few years ago, shortly after the scandal surrounding Libor had begun to break, I attended 
a seminar on corporate social responsibility. Libor was the latest in a long list of corporate 
scandals to come to light and I couldn’t help wondering why academics seemed more 
interested in corporate social responsibility than corporate social irresponsibility. Since then, 
of course, the scandals have continued to come thick and fast. Accounting scandals 
(Tescos, Toshiba) have piled up on top of tax avoidance scandals (Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Starbucks, Apple), and an assortment of other improprieties (Volkswagen 
cheating with its emissions tests, Exxon Mobil apparently deliberately misleading the public 
about its research into climate change). Scandals of this sort are not, of course, new, but 
corporate irresponsibility does seem to be scaling new heights. In seeking an explanation, 
some would no doubt point an accusatory finger at the ideology of ‘maximizing shareholder 
value’. And with good reason. But in recent years, shareholder-value ideology has receded 
without any noticeable impact on corporate behavior. Indeed, placing too much emphasis 
on its baleful effects risks causing us to overlook the more deeply rooted institutional 
foundations of corporate irresponsibility. This paper explores these foundations. The 
potential for irresponsibility, it argues, is inscribed in the corporate legal form as currently 
constituted and thus in the property rights structures of contemporary capitalism. 
Paradoxically, it suggests, so too is the possibility of more ‘socialized’ corporations. While, 
therefore, experimentation with alternative organizational forms is vitally important to social 
transformation, with so many key productive resources under the direct or indirect control of 
corporations, so too is radical reform of the corporate legal form.  
 
The Railtrack Cases 
I’m going to begin my exploration of the institutional roots of CSI by examining a couple of 
cases decided in autumn 2005. Both involved Railtrack, the group of companies created by 
the government to manage the rail infrastructure after privatisation in the early 1990s.1 In 
the first, decided in September, Railtrack was fined £3.5 million for the safety breaches 
which led to a crash at Hatfield in 2000 in which four people died and over 70 were injured. 
Hatfield was the third major crash in the five years after privatization: at Southall in 1997, six 
people died and 150 were injured; at Ladbroke Grove in 1999, 31 people died and 523 were 
injured. All three accidents were attributed in significant part to factors under Railtrack's 
control, in the case of Hatfield to cracks in the rails which the company had known about for 
two years but not got round to fixing.2 The Southall and Ladbroke Grove crashes were 
attributed variously to inexperienced and inadequately trained drivers, faulty equipment, 
poorly located signals, poor maintenance, failure to invest in safety enhancing technologies 
                                                 
1 Railtrack was sold to the private sector in May 1996. By 2005, it had been replaced by the state-controlled, 
non-profit company, Network Rail, a company limited by guarantee and formed in 2002. 
2 Train Derailment at Hatfield: Final Report by Independent Investigation Board, 110 
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and so on. In the Hatfield case, the court condemned Railtracks attitude and safety record: 
it was, the judge said, the 'worst example of sustained negligence in a high risk industry that 
he had ever seen'.3   
 
The second case, Weir & Others v Secretary of State for Transport & the Department of 
Transport, was decided a month later. It too arose out the Hatfield crash, albeit indirectly. 
Hatfield forced Railtrack to check for cracks across the railway system and this led to speed 
limits and line closures. As a result the company haemorrhaged money and was soon in 
serious financial difficulty, its shares plunging from an earlier high of over £17.50 to £4.00. 
The government considered various options, before settling on receivorship. In October 
2001 Railtrack plc was placed into administration and trading in the company’s shares, now 
virtually worthless, suspended.4 Initially, the government refused to pay compensation, but 
two shareholder action groups were formed and the large institutional shareholders exerted 
intense pressure on the government.5 An offer of £2.50 per share was eventually made6  
which the institutions and one of the action groups accepted, clearly reckoning they’d done 
as well as they could in the circumstances. But the other shareholder group, the Railtrack 
Private Shareholders Action Group (RPSAG), representing nearly 50,000 smaller 
shareholders, rejected the offer.  
 
The members of RPSAG organized and raised a total of nearly £4m to hire lawyers to sue 
the government in the largest class action seen in British law. It was a phenomenal effort on 
their part.7 Motivated by the belief that their property had been expropriated by the state, 
they expended a huge amount of time, energy and money bringing the case to court. They 
argued that the Secretary of State involved, Steven Byers, was guilty of breaches of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (expropriating property without proper 
compensation) and of misfeasance in public office (abusing his powers to engineer back 
door re-nationalization). They were supported by many in Parliament and the media, 
particularly the Daily Telegraph and Evening Standard, who shared the shareholders’ view 
that their property had been stolen. Nobody, however, was quite sure what the stolen 
property was. Some suggested it was the shareholders’ shares; others that it was the 
company’s assets; still others it was ‘the company’ itself. ‘We the shareholders owned RTK 
[Railtrack]’, claimed one shareholder; ‘Railtrack Group owns Railtrack plc and we 
shareholders own both’ claimed another.8 Yet another accused the Government of plotting 
                                                 
3 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1519644/Fined-13m-but-Hatfield-rail-firms-given-21m-costs.html 
4 The shareholders had shares in Railtrack Group plc, whose main operating subsidiary, Railtrack plc, was the 
company placed into administration. Under European rules, had the company been re-nationalized 
shareholders would have been entitled to about £8 per, the average price of the shares over the previous three 
years. Prior to suspension, the company’s shares were trading at £2.80; the three year average price included 
the £17.68 high. 
5 See Louise Butcher, ‘Railways: Railtrack administration and the private shareholders, 2001-05’, HC Standard 
Note SN/BT/1076, 10/8/2010, p7. 
6 The Government was particularly concerned about the reaction of the bondholders and large US institutions. 
In their internal communications, the small shareholders were variously (rather contemptuously) described as 
‘grannies who might lose their blouses’ and ‘little old ladies’. 
7 See ‘Railtrack Shareholders – What kept us going’, Private Investor, Issue 109, Dec/Jan 2006, p 3-4 
8  http://boards.fool.co.uk/possible-amount-of-compensation-9347245.aspx?sort=whole.  
http://boards.fool.co.uk/railtrack-plc-v-railtrack-group-6956032.aspx?sort=whole.  
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to ‘steal [the] company from its rightful owners’.9 In similar vein, the Daily Telegraph wrote 
of the ‘expropriation of Railtrack’s owners’.10  
 
The case was lost. The claim that there had been a de facto expropriation was dropped 
during the course of argument and the shareholders’ other claims decisively rejected by the 
judge.11 The abandonment of the expropriation claim was unsurprising: its weakness had 
led the lawyers representing the other shareholders to settle. In law, the company as a 
separate legal entity owns the corporate assets, not the shareholders. The shareholders 
own shares and in this case they were more or less worthless. Moreover, the idea that the 
shareholders of large public corporations like Railtrack ‘own’ the company is legally 
unsustainable. As many have pointed out, using Honore's ‘incidents of ownership’ as a 
yardstick, shareholders possess few of the rights of corporate owners.12 It nevertheless 
remains an important and powerful part of our everyday, taken-for-granted common sense. 
‘Back when I was a law student in the early 1980s’, Lynn Stout recounts, ‘my professors 
taught me that shareholders “own” corporations … [A]t the time … this made sense enough 
to me’13 The significance of this should not be underestimated, for legally unsustainable 
though it may be, it played a key role in the Railtrack cases and perpetuates the idea of 
shareholder primacy as a simple matter of property right. Thus when the law asserts that 
directors are legally bound to promote the ‘interests’ or ‘success’ of ‘the company’, this is 
usually interpreted to mean the interests of the company’s shareholders. 
 
Corporate Schizophrenia 
The Railtrack cases are illustrative of the schizophrenic nature of our ideas about 
corporations and their relationship with their shareholders. 14   They show that in some 
contexts the existence of the corporation as a separate legal person is taken very seriously 
indeed, both in law and common sense. Thus, not only were Railtrack’s shareholders not 
                                                 
9 http://boards.fool.co.uk/i-am-a-little-slow-this-morning-the-telegraph-9348450.aspx 
10  Daily Telegraph, ‘The Bad Old Days’, 15/1/2002. A few years later similar claims were made by the 
shareholders of the collapsed bank, Northern Rock. They had been ‘robbed’, they argued, when the Bank of 
England abused its position of lender of last resort to enable the government to expropriate the bank’s assets: 
see Joanna Gray, ‘Northern Rock shareholders’ challenge to basis of compensation in nationalisation 
considered in high court and court of appeal’, 17 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2009), 467. 
The shareholders, a mixture of hedge funds and small holders, initiated proceedings against the government 
but the case was lost in both the High Court and Court of Appeal and when the European Court of Human 
Rights unanimously dismissed their case as manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible: Dennis Grainger and 
others v UK (Application No. 34940/10). The Chairman of the Northern Rock Shareholders Action Group, Chris 
Hulme, declared the decision a violation of property and ownership rights: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9445059/European-court-rejects-
Northern-Rock-shareholders-case.html. Two hedge funds led the action, claiming that shareholders should 
have received £4 a share given the bank’s substantial assets: see Marion Dakers, Daily Telegraph, 30/4/15:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11574454/Northern-Rock-shareholders-
hit-out-at-Milibands-inaction.html. But the accountancy firm, BDO, concluded the shares were worthless at the 
time of nationalisation: see Phllip Inman, The Guardian 1/3/16: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/30/northern-rock-shareholders-valuation.  
11 Weir and others v Secretary of State for Transport and another, [2005] EWHC 2192 (Ch).  
12  See, for example, John Kay, ‘The Stakeholder Corporation’, in Kelly, Kelly & Gamble, Stakeholder 
Capitalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Paddy Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Corporate 
Ownership’, (1999), 62 MLR, 32.   
13 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco, 2012), v. 
14 In this article the term ‘corporation’ is generally used, as it is in everyday usage, to refer to publicly quoted 
companies. The schizophrenia alluded to here is rather different from that alluded to by William Allen in his 
‘Our Schizophrenic Concept of the Business Corporation’, 14 Cardozo LR (1992), 261. 
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held legally liable for the company's appalling safety record, nobody seems to have 
considered them morally responsible for it either. The same was true of the shareholders of 
the banks involved in the financial crash and the shareholders of BP after Deepwater 
Horizon. Few considered them morally, let alone legally, responsible for the damage caused 
by, or debts of, the corporations concerned, and the shareholders themselves showed no 
signs of remorse or guilt - it was ‘the company’, a completely separate (property-owning) 
legal person, that was responsible, not them. In the Railtrack case this sense of separation 
was manifested in the fact that while Railtrack’s shareholders expended a lot of time, energy 
and money trying to remedy what they saw as the theft of their property, they did nothing to 
address the company’s dreadful safety record. Indeed, in blogs they made it clear that they 
thought this nothing to do with them15, and in court their lawyer explicitly argued that they 
were in no way responsible for what he called ‘the sins of the company’.16 On the other hand, 
the cases also show that in other contexts the existence of the company as a separate legal 
person is largely ignored. Thus, the shareholders themselves and many media 
commentators clearly saw Railtrack as an object of property owned by its shareholders, 
hence the belief that the shareholders had been robbed and the idea, embedded in legal 
thought, that as ‘things’ owned by their shareholders, corporations should be run in their 
interest as a matter of simple property right. In these contexts, far from being regarded as 
‘completely separate’, large corporations and their shareholders are treated as more or less 
synonymous.17  
 
As a result of this corporate schizophrenia, shareholders are able to assert, in a manner 
which is generally seen as perfectly appropriate and legitimate, ‘ownership’ claims over 
corporations which enable them to insist on the maximisation of their returns. At the same 
time they are seen as bearing, in a manner thought equally appropriate and legitimate, no 
responsibility for the wrongs committed and damage caused by these corporations.  
Moreover, there is a clear link between these schizophrenic ideas and the problem of 
corporate irresponsibility. As Railtrack’s CEO, Gerald Corbett, conceded in a radio interview 
shortly after the company’s Hatfield conviction, there was a tension between the shareholder 
interest and the company's public service obligations. ‘The only way we can make profits’, 
he confessed, ‘is by not doing the things we should to make the railways better’ 18 He might 
of course have added, ‘and safer too’.  
 
                                                 
15 One RPSAG member wrote: ‘And enough of the rants about safety – if BP can safely run a thermal hydrogen 
cracker 2 miles from the secondary school in Grangemouth, then Railtrack could most certainly run the 
railways’: http://boards.fool.co.uk/i-think-its-more-appropriate-to-note-that-the-8173639.aspx.  
16  See Commons Standard Library Note, SN 01076, ‘Railways: Railtrack administration and the private 
shareholders, 2001-2005’ (10/8/10):  http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-
papers/SN01076/railways-railtrack-administration-and-the-private-shareholders-20012005.  
17 On ‘complete separation’, see Gower & Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law (9th ed., 2012), 35-38. 
Under s172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, the ‘success of the company’ is identified with ‘the benefit of the 
members as a whole’. See also John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (OUP, 1993), 74-92.  
18 Interview on the Today programme, BBC Radio 4, 17/12/99, cited in Brendan Martin, ‘The High Public price 
of Britain’s private railway’, Public World, November 2010. In similar vein, National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill concluded that the disaster was ultimately traceable to a string of decisions to 
ignore standard safety procedures to cut costs: see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (Jan 2011).   
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Some degree of mental splitting19 is, of course, inherent in the corporate legal form and the 
doctrine of separate corporate personality. But history suggests that corporate 
schizophrenia in the extreme form described above is a historical and legal product. Clues 
as to its institutional origins are to be found in an article written by Edward Warren, a Harvard 
Law Professor, in the 1920s. In a discussion of 18th and 19th century English joint stock 
companies (JSCs), Warren complained about the poor grammar of contemporary English 
judges and lawyers. What irked him was that they kept referring to incorporated companies 
as 'theys', as though were made up of their shareholders, and to the assets of those 
companies as though they belonged to those shareholders. They failed, in other words, to 
recognise the existence of the corporation as a separate property-owning entity, an 'it'.20  
 
Warren was right: eighteenth and nineteenth century English judges and lawyers did refer 
to JSCs as ‘theys’ as if they were composed of shareholders. He was, however, wrong to 
suggest that this practice was confined to the English – their US counterparts did likewise21 
– and equally wrong to suggest that these practices were the result of poor grammar or 
conceptual error. Warren clearly thought the act of incorporation always created a property-
owning corporate entity which was radically separate from its shareholders. History makes 
it clear, however, that the perceived nature of incorporated companies and their relationship 
with their shareholders changed during course of the nineteenth century. Put simply, there 
was a move from a conception of corporations as their shareholders merged into a single, 
legally distinct body – as personified legal persons, separate entities made up of their flesh-
and-blood members (and therefore ‘theys’) - to a conception of them as de-personified legal 
persons, reified ‘things’, ‘its’, cleansed of shareholders. It was only in the mid-late nineteenth 
century and early-twentieth centuries that this de-personified conception of the corporate 
entity began to crystallise and references to corporations with singular verbs and nouns 
‘come to dominate, and the plural constructions that typified the first half of the century 
gradually disappear’.22 The question is: what underlay this shift? 
 
Company Law and the Joint Stock Company  
Pointers to the answer are to be found in one of the differences between the UK and the 
US: what in the UK is called ‘company law’ is referred to as ‘corporate law’ in the US. 
Nowadays, this difference is treated as of little consequence: the subject matters of company 
law and corporate law are basically the same. But its historical origins are revealing. Both 
‘corporate law’ and ‘company law’ were nineteenth century constructs, the first books on 
which were published in the 1830s: Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames’ The Law of Private 
Corporations Aggregate appeared in 1832, followed in 1836 by Charles Wordsworth’s The 
Law Relating to Railway, Bank, Insurance, Mining and Other Joint Stock Companies.23 But 
                                                 
19 The term ‘schizophrenie’, derived from the Greek ‘skhizein’ (to split) and ‘phreno’ (mind), was coined in 
1910 by Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler. 
20 E H Warren, ‘Safeguarding the creditors of corporations’ 26 Harvard Law Review (1923) 509). 
21 In the early nineteenth century, American judges also ‘frequently refer[red] to corporations as “theys” rather 
than its’: see E M Dodd, American Business Corporations until 1860 (Harvard UP, 1954), 66. This has been 
confirmed by Naomi Lamoreaux: ‘Partnerships, Corporations and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in US 
History’, in Kenneth Lipartito & David B Sicilia, Constructing Corporate America (OUP, 2004) p29.  
22 Lamoreaux, ibid, 44-45.  
23 Joseph Angell & Samuel Ames, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate (Boston: Hilliard, 
Gray, Little & Watkins, 1st ed., 1832); Charles Wordsworth, The Law Relating to Railway, Bank, Insurance 
Mining, and Other Joint Stock Companies (Butterworth, 1st ed., 1836; 2nd ed., 1837). 
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they were rather different in orientation and approach. Like both corporate law and company 
law texts today, Angell and Ames’ treatise was organised around the corporate legal form, 
embracing all associations with corporate status. Nowadays, of course, this means 
businesses of all economic types, from large multinationals to medium-sized firms to small 
corner shops, all of which can (and do) become incorporated companies. In the eighteenth 
and for much of the nineteenth century, however, the term ‘company’ was an abridgement 
of ‘joint stock company’ and as the title of Wordsworth’s book suggests, ‘company law’ (such 
as it was) was an abridgement of ‘joint stock company law’. Crucially, in eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Britain some JSCs were incorporated, but many were not: JSCs were 
defined not by reference to their legal status but by reference to their economic nature. 
Organised around the JSC economic form rather than the corporate legal form, 
Wordsworth’s book encompassed all JSCs regardless of their legal status.24 
 
Adam Smith described the key characteristics of the ideally typical JSC in Wealth of Nations 
when he distinguished the JSC from the ‘private co-partnery’.25 The ideally-typical private 
co-partnery or partnership was based around a small number of closely-related individuals 
who were active participants in the firm. In law, this was reflected in the principles of mutual 
agency (whereby partners could bind one another), joint asset ownership (whereby partners 
were joint owners of the partnership property), and joint and several unlimited liability. For 
inactive ‘investors’ who opted to become partners rather than creditors in search of returns 
better than those available from government debt and usury-capped loans, legal principles 
like unlimited liability were a problem. But the prevailing view was that by ensuring that 
partners were active and alert, and success rewarded and failure punished, unlimited liability 
not only accorded with the natural principles of justice and ‘the market’ but operated in the 
public interest by ensuring that firms were run efficiently. The ‘partnership system of 
commerce’ was widely regarded as the foundation of British economic success.26  
 
By contrast, JSCs were based around a capital fund and had many more members, most of 
whom were inactive, their interest in the firm being largely, if not wholly, financial. The 
‘proprietors’ of JSCs, Smith wrote, ‘seldom pretend to understand anything of the business 
of the company; … and give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such 
half yearly dividend or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them’.27 As 
this suggests, JSCs were the precursors of today's large corporations and vehicles not only 
for productive activity, but for rentier investment. It followed that JSCs were characterised 
by a separation of ownership and management, and by (more or less) freely transferable 
shares. Indeed, it was the size, nature, and changing character of their memberships that 
made the possession by JSCs of corporate privileges so desirable. It also, Smith argued, 
rendered them inherently less efficient than owner-managed firms. Populated by passive, 
                                                 
24 The same was essentially true of American ‘corporate law’, though the situation was more complicated 
because capital shortages meant individual states were more willing to grant corporate privileges to facilitate 
the formation of firms that would foster development. However, the link between incorporation and JSCs 
remained: see Angell and Ames, v-vi. 
25 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776, Liberty Fund 1982, ed by Campbell, Skinner & Todd), Volume II, 
731-758. The section on JSCs appeared in the 3rd edition, published in 1784.   
26 See Paddy Ireland, ‘Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility’, 
(2010) Cambridge Journal of Economics, 837. 
27 Smith, note 25, 741. 
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rentier shareholders and led by directors managing ‘other people’s money’, JSCs were likely 
to be characterised by ‘negligence and profusion’. He concluded nevertheless that there 
were certain circumstances in which facilitating JSC formation was in the public interest. 
Thus, JSCs should be granted ‘exemptions from the general law’ (like limited liability) where 
the capital required was beyond the capacity of a private partnership; where the risks were 
unusually great; where there was an identifiable public benefit; and where the operations of 
the business could be reduced to a routine.28  
 
Smith’s ideas about the legitimate scope of the JSC shaped state policy and public opinion 
well into the nineteenth century with the result that throughout this period corporate 
privileges were granted sparingly, forcing many JSCs to operate as unincorporated 
concerns.29 The story was very different in the US, where states granted corporate privileges 
much more readily, hence the different approaches and scopes of the Angell & Ames and 
Wordsworth books. It is nevertheless clear that even in the UK JSCs were from their inception 
associated with corporate status and privileges, even if not all JSCs were able to secure them. 
When incorporation and limited liability were made freely available, in 1844 and 1855 
respectively, the link became even stronger, for thereafter nearly all JSCs were legally 
obliged to incorporate. As a result, in the business context, the JSC and the corporate legal 
form became more or less co-extensive. It was only towards the end of the century and the 
rise of the ‘private’ company that the link was broken. Thereafter, ‘company law’ came to 
encompass not only JSCs but all incorporated firms, irrespective of their economic natures.  
 
Accommodating the Rentier  
In empirical reality, at this time the line between the private partnership and the JSC was 
fuzzy. A lot of firms emerged with relatively large memberships, some degree of separation 
of ownership and management, and transferable shares. Some were incorporated, others 
not. But many of these firms were more in the nature of ‘extended partnerships’ than ‘pure’ 
JSCs, their shareholders often having more than a purely financial interest and involvement 
in the enterprise.30 Indeed, even if they aspired to be pure money capitalists, members of 
these firms were hampered by the legal restrictions on share transfers, the absence of a 
developed share market, and by the legal conceptualization of shares in both incorporated 
and unincorporated companies as equitable interests in the company’s assets. Moreover, 
shares at this time were rarely fully paid up and the resulting residual liabilities created ties 
between both shareholders and companies, and between shareholders inter se.31 These 
material realities were reflected in the tendency, which continued well into the nineteenth 
century, to treat shareholders as ‘partners’ and to treat JSCs, incorporated as well as 
unincorporated, as types of partnership. In the jargon of the day, JSCs were ‘public’, rather 
than ‘private’, partnerships. As a result it was regarded as more or less axiomatic that all joint 
                                                 
28 Smith, note 25, 757-58   
29 As late as 1840 one finds a series of leading articles in The Times denigrating JSC shareholders as wanting 
to ‘make money in idleness’ and arguing that JSCs were ‘inconsistent with the solid and proper principles of 
trade’ and partnership’: 9 October 1840; 22 October 1840. There was, the paper added, ‘only one more quality 
wanting to make the morsel wholesome as well as tempting’ to the idle rentier - limited liability: see James 
Taylor, Creating Capitalism (2006).  
30 See Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson & James Taylor, Shareholder Democracies (2012). 
31 With shares only partly paid up, there were good reasons for shareholders to be concerned about the 
financial wherewithal of their fellow members. 
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stock companies were governed by the general law of partnership except in the important 
respects in which, in the case of incorporated firms, the latter had been ` superceded' or ` limited 
and restrained' by the instrument of incorporation. Another result, noted by Warren, was that 
JSCs were seen, like partnerships, as aggregates of individuals - as ‘theys’. Even when a 
JSC acquired corporate status, the separate corporate entity was still seen as composed of 
people – as a personified legal person.32 In these circumstances the sense of ‘complete 
separation’ from the company felt by Railtrack’s shareholders was simply not possible.  
 
The second half of the nineteenth century, however, saw the emergence of much ‘purer’ JSCs 
and much ‘purer’ money capitalist shareholding, a development driven by the rise of railway 
companies which needed to raise huge amounts of capital by contemporary standards. The 
result was the appearance of companies populated by thousands (rather than tens or 
hundreds) of pure rentier investors and the emergence for the first time of a developed share 
market. This changed the character of the JSC and JSC shareholding and prompted a series 
of modifications to the law of partnership as it was applied to JSCs the cumulative effect of 
which was to accommodate and offer protection to shareholders.33 In Robert Flannigan’s 
words, a ‘sustained effort’ was made ‘to design ... arrangements that exposed passive 
investors to something less than the general liability of principals’.34 The legislative changes, 
and in particular the introduction of incorporation by registration and general limited liability, 
are well-known. However, a series of judicial changes were also made to the law of 
partnership as it applied to JSCs: the partnership doctrine of mutual agency was abandoned 
and the doctrine of ultra vires was reformulated, for example.35 In this context it is not, 
perhaps, insignificant that more and more of the law-makers, legislative and judicial, were 
themselves becoming members of the shareholding class. 
 
One of the key judicial changes was the radical re-conceptualisation of the nature of the 
JSC share. From the 1830s, the courts began to treat shares not as interests (legal or 
equitable) in the assets of companies but as intangible rights to profit; and to treat 
shareholders not as asset-owners but as money-providers. Shareholders in both 
incorporated and unincorporated companies came to be seen, in the manner of creditors, 
as transferring ownership of their money to a company, which then invested it in assets 
which it (‘the company’) wholly (legally and equitably) owned.36 Henceforth there were two 
quite separate forms of property: the assets owned by ‘the company’ (incorporated or not) 
and the shares (rights to profit) owned by the shareholders. In this way, all JSCs, 
incorporated and unincorporated 37 , came to be seen as property-owing entities quite 
separate from their share-owning shareholders. This was exemplified by a change of 
wording in the 1856 and 1862 (Joint-Stock) Companies Acts. Whereas the 1856 Act 
permitted seven or more shareholders to ‘form themselves into a company’, the 1862 Act 
permitted them to ‘form a company’, suggesting that the latter was an entity made by, but 
                                                 
32 See Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the capitalist’, 17 Journal of Legal History (1996) 40. On the 
application of partnership principles to JSCs, see Wordsworth, 35, 64, 101-4. 
33 See Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory’, 23 Legal Studies (2003), 453. 
34 Robert Flannigan, ‘The Political Imposture of Passive Capital’, (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 
139 at 146-47. 
35 See Ireland, note 33.  
36 Bligh v Brent (1836), 2 Y&C Ex 268. 
37 Watson v Spratley (1854), 10 Ex 222. 
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not of, them. This was an important step in the gradual shift from a conception of the JSC 
as a legal person composed of its shareholders to a conception of the JSC as a reified entity 
cleansed of and external to them.38  
 
As part of these processes, shareholders – increasingly seen not as active ‘partners’ but as 
passive ‘investors’ – gradually handed over many of the rights and obligations traditionally 
associated with ownership to directors and managers. The introduction of limited liability 
had, of course, made this much less risky. By the end of the century, the risks had been 
further diminished as high denomination, partly paid-up shares which put the personal 
assets of shareholders at risk were replaced by lower denomination, fully paid-up shares. 
De jure limited liability thus became de facto no-liability. With the residual liabilities attached 
to JSC shares all but eliminated, the remaining connections between companies and their 
shareholders, and between shareholders and third party creditors, were severed. This 
completed the separation of shareholders from companies, paving the way for the full 
reification of the company and emergence of the doctrine of separate corporate personality 
in its modern form. The institutional foundations of corporate irresponsibility were now in 
place.  
 
Fully paid-up shares have enabled shareholders to detach from the companies in which they 
hold shares with minimal risk. Not only do they no longer perform managerial functions, they 
are no longer burdened with residual liabilities. All they ever stand to lose is the money spent 
on their shares and they have, of course, mitigated this risk by delegating management of 
their money (as well management of the company) to others and by diversifying their 
investments. In this context, the complete detachment felt by Railtrack’s shareholders from 
the company - at least in the context of liability for the company’s debts and responsibility 
for its safety record – is perfectly understandable. Although they have been relieved of 
responsibility and liability, however, shareholders have retained certain key proprietary 
rights, most notably the power to dismiss directros. Shareholder retention of these crucial 
residual control rights, together with the emergence of the conception of the company as a 
de-personified, reified ‘thing’ (an ‘it’), underpins the idea - part of our common sense, as the 
Railtrack cases vividly illustrate - that the company is an object of property ‘owned’ by its 
shareholders.  
 
The Janus-Faced Shareholder: Owner or Creditor? 
Corporate shareholding is, then, a very odd legal phenomenon. Shareholders have acquired 
a ‘novel status’39 in which they are simultaneously ‘insider-owners’ with residual proprietary 
rights, able to elect and dismiss directors and insist that the company is run in their exclusive 
interests; and ‘outsiders’ who, like creditors, have transferred ownership of their property to 
this separate legal entity and become responsibility- and liability-free.  
 
The Janus-faced nature of corporate shareholding is reflected in the difficulty company 
lawyers have capturing the legal nature of the share. One of the most oft-cited definitions, 
that of Farwell J in Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd, sought to encompass both the 
                                                 
38 Ireland, note 26, 846. 
39 Robert Flannigan, ‘Shareholder Fiduciary Accountability’ [2014] Journal of Business Law, 1 at 6. 
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proprietary and contractual dimensions of the share, describing it as ‘the interest of a 
shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the 
first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants 
entered into by all the shareholders inter se’.40 This foregrounds the contractual dimensions 
(‘liability’, ‘covenant’) of shares while noting their proprietary dimension (‘interest’). In similar 
vein, for Robert Pennington shares `are simply bundles of contractual and statutory rights 
which the shareholder has against the company'. Pennington is aware that this suggests that 
the relationship between shareholders and companies ‘is that of creditor and debtor', but 
assures us that this is `quite wrong'. Being transferable, he says, the contractual rights which 
make up the share are of `a peculiar nature', which this has led to them being called property. 
Discomforted by this, but not wanting to dismiss it out of hand, Pennington says this view is 
`innocuous enough, provided that it is remembered that they do not comprise any proprietary 
interest in the company's assets'. Pennington concludes that shares are ‘a species of 
intangible movable property which comprise a collection of rights and obligations relating to 
an interest in a company of an economic and proprietary character, but not constituting a 
debt'. This covers all the bases but is about as clear as mud.41  
 
Others, struggling with the same problem, have placed much greater emphasis on the 
proprietary qualities of shares. Gower, for example, thought Farwell’s definition laid 
‘disproportionate stress on the contractual nature of the shareholder's rights’ and sought to 
highlight Farwell’s claim that the shareholder has an ‘interest in the company', arguing that 
this underlined the ‘insider’ status of shareholders by constituting them as ‘members of the 
company'. Gower recognised that it was ‘tempting to equate shares with rights under a 
contract', but insisted that a share was ‘something far more than a mere contractual right in 
personam'. It might not be possible to classify ‘the rights which a share confers on its holder 
… as "proprietary" in the usual sense', but it was clear that `the share itself is an object of 
dominion, i.e. of rights in rem and not so to regard it would be barren and academic in the 
extreme'. For all practical purposes shares are recognised in law, as well as in fact, ` as objects 
of property which are bought, sold, mortgaged and bequeathed.' Gower knew, however, that 
this mixing of rights in rem with rights in personam didn’t make it easy to specify the precise 
nature of this proprietary interest: ‘The theory’, Gower argued, ‘seems to be that the contract 
constituted by the articles of association defines the nature of the rights, which, however, are 
not purely personal rights but instead confer some sort of proprietary interest in the company 
though not in its property’.42 This view was recently endorsed by Lord Miller. ‘It is customary’, 
he argued, ‘to describe [a share] as “bundle of rights and liabilities” and this is probably the 
nearest one can get to its character, provided that it is appreciated that it is more than a bundle 
of contractual rights .. These rights … are not purely personal rights. They confer proprietary 
rights in the company though not in its property’.43 
 
The Janus-faced nature of shareholding lies at the heart of contemporary corporate 
irresponsibility. Shareholders have been relieved, like creditors, of responsibility for 
                                                 
40 [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288. 
41 Robert Pennington, Company Law (London, Butterworths, 7th ed., 1995), 56-57, 135-36; Robert Pennington, 
`Can Shares in Companies be Defined?' (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 144.  
42 LCB Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed 1979), 299-301, 400.   
43 HM Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Laird Group plc [2003] UKHL 54 at para 35 
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corporate wrongs and debts, but permitted to retain residual proprietary rights which enable 
them to ensure that corporations are run in their exclusive interests. They are able, therefore, 
to draw revenues without actually doing anything and to insist on the maximisation of those 
revenues without having to worry about how they are generated, safe in the knowledge that, 
like creditors, they will be held neither legally liable nor morally responsible for corporate 
debts and misdemeanours. As Harry Glasbeek says, 'corporate shareholders have little 
financial or other incentive to ensure that managers behave legally, ethically or decently .... 
Because in law they are personally untouchable...'.44 This was, of course, was only too 
evident in the Railtrack cases. 
 
The Corporate Revolution: Towards Socialization or Financialization? 
Corporate social irresponsibility was not, however, the inevitable outcome of the rise of the 
JSC and passive rentier shareholding. As many late C19th and early C20th commentators 
recognized, the ‘corporate revolution was double-edged, containing within it two very 
different possible futures. The first, rooted in the residual proprietary rights attached to 
shares, involved the emergence of increasingly “financialized” corporations and an 
increasingly ‘financialized’ capitalism. The second, rooted in the increasingly creditor-like 
nature of shareholding, involved the emergence of less profit-oriented and more ‘socialized’ 
corporations and an increasingly ‘socialized’ capitalism. Historically, we have at different 
times headed in both directions.  
 
These alternative futures figured in the work of writers as diverse as Marx, Hilferding, 
Veblen, Lippmann, Tawney, Laski and Keynes. Marx, for example, saw the rise of the JSC 
as a potentially ‘progressive’ development which was evidence of the way in which 
advancing technology was causing business enterprises to assume the form of ‘social’ 
rather than ‘private undertakings’. The rise of the JSC, he argued, marked the beginning of 
the supersession of the means of production as private property and the ‘abolition of capital 
as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself’.  Echoing Smith, Marx 
also recognized the diminution of the shareholder to something resembling a creditor, 
observing that in JSCs the ‘actually functioning capitalist’ was transformed into ‘a mere 
manager, administrator of other people’s capital’, while the ‘owners of capital’ were 
transformed into ‘mere money capitalists’ who received their rewards in the form of interest, 
‘as mere compensation for owning capital that now is entirely divorced from function in the 
actual process of production’. JSCs thus entailed ‘private production without the control of 
private property’. Moreover, with shareholders redundant, there was no reason why 
management functions couldn’t be delegated to workers managing their own firms. This led 
Marx explicitly to link the growing number of JSCs to the rise of the co-operative movement 
‘The capitalist stock companies’, he wrote, ‘as much as the co-operative factories, should 
be considered as transitional forms from the capitalist mode of production to socialism’ 
whereby capital would be ‘reconverted’ into the property of associated producers, ‘outright 
social property’. The only distinction was that ‘the antagonism is resolved negatively in the 
one and positively in the other’.  
 
                                                 
44 Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth (Toronto, Between the Lines, 2002), 129.  
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On the other hand, Marx also recognized that one of the immediate effects of these 
developments had been an ‘enormous centralization’ of money capital in banks in their 
‘capacity of representatives of all money lenders’. These institutions had become ‘the 
general managers of money-capital’, the representatives of ‘capital in general’. This, he 
observed, had created a ‘financial oligarchy’, a ‘new financial aristocracy’ with ‘money 
power’. Moreover, because their value inevitably involved speculations about the future, 
JSC shares encouraged gambling. The rise of the JSC had thus been accompanied by the 
development of a ‘whole system of swindling and cheating’, centring on ‘corporation 
promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation’. This new ‘class of parasites’ had ‘the 
fabulous power not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in 
production in a most dangerous manner’.45 For Marx, then, while the rise of the credit system 
and JSC were potentially steps on road to socialisation, their immediate effect had been 
productively dysfunctional ‘financialization’.  
 
A number of later commentators also recognized the double-edged nature of the rise of the 
corporate economy. Rudolf Hilferding, for example, noted the reduction of the shareholder 
to something resembling a creditor (shares, he said, represented ‘creditor’s claims on future 
production’) and argued that the rise of the JSC and of ‘finance capital’ was ‘establish[ing] 
social control of production’ and ‘socialize[d] production’. The problem was that they 
represented an ‘antagonistic’ or ‘fraudulent’ form of socialization in which the control of 
production ‘remain[ed] vested in an oligarchy’. Hilferding nevertheless saw this as 
progressive, for it had ‘facilitate[d] enormously the task of overcoming capitalism’: taking 
possession of ‘six large Berlin banks’ would now enable one to take control of the most 
important spheres of industry. The key was ‘the struggle to dispossess this oligarchy’.46 
Although often written in a very different idiom, similar themes ran through the work of the 
American political commentator, Walter Lippmann. He too placed great emphasis on the 
creditor-like nature of corporate shareholding. ‘In theory’, he wrote, the stockholder was one 
of the corporation’s ‘owners’, but the modern shareholder was a ‘very feeble representative 
of the institution of private property’, having no productive role to play and no responsibilities 
to discharge: the ‘one qualification’ was the ‘possession of some money and the desire for 
more’. ‘Deprived of their property rights’, shareholders had become ‘transient’ ‘absentee 
owners’, who flitted like ‘butterfl[ies] from industry to industry’ with their liquid, mobile capital. 
It was unrealistic to expect a ‘high sense of social responsibility’ from them. Lippmann went 
further, however, arguing that socialization was already becoming a reality. There had been 
a discernible ‘change in business motives’ and a ‘revolution in business incentives’. 
Business and management were becoming ‘professions’ akin to medicine, law and 
engineering in which ‘motives other than profit came into play’. It was true that ‘control ha[d] 
passed for the time being into the hands of investment experts, the banking interests’, but 
this was already being challenged—not by the ‘decadent stockholders’ but by ‘those most 
interested in the methods of industry: the consumer, the worker and the citizen at large’.47  
 
                                                 
45 Karl Marx, Capital Volume III, chapters 23, 25, 27. 
46 Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital (1909, Routledge ed., 2007), 110-11, 367-8.   
47 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (1914; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, introduction by 
Walter Leuchtenburg,) 
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Not everyone, however, was as confident that financial domination was a temporary stop on 
the road to socialization. The American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen could 
see the progressive potential of the rise of the large corporation. It rendered, he argued, the 
idea of individual property rights in the means of production hopelessly outdated: modern 
technology not only made a more ‘socialized’ economy possible, it demanded it. But it had 
also seen ‘industry’, the technical processes concerned with the efficient production of useful 
goods, fall under the control of ‘business’ – by which Veblen meant ‘parasitic’ financial 
interests more concerned with making money than things. As a result industrial processes 
were being managed to secure pecuniary gains for the owners of financial property rather 
than to enhance productive efficiency.48 The ‘financial community’, Veblen argued, had 
taken over ownership of the country’s largest corporations and thereby gained control of ‘the 
usufruct of [its] industrial system’ 49  Crucially, the financial interests of ‘absentee’ 
shareholder-owners often obstructed productive activity and conspired against the full use 
of the ‘industrial arts’, for larger profits were often to be had from financial manipulation and 
obstructing production. Having little faith in class struggle as a way of realizing the 
possibilities inherent in modern industry and technology, Veblen struggled to see how these 
vested financial interests might be overcome.  
 
Towards Socialised Corporations?  
Over the course of the following century the double-edged nature of the ‘corporate 
revolution’ repeatedly surfaced, finding expression in the continuing debates about the 
nature of the corporation and the changing trajectories of corporate governance. In simple 
terms, a period of intensely financialized governance at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries – ‘the first financial hegemony’50 - was followed by a 
period of increasingly socialized governance. This has in turn been followed in recent 
decades by the return of financialized governance and a highly financialized, neoliberal 
capitalism. 
 
Claims that corporations were being socialized began to surface early in the twentieth 
century. They were rooted in beliefs about the growing dispersal and disempowerment of 
shareholders and growing power of professionalized and increasingly beneficent managers.  
As we have seen, Walter Lippmann was making claims about the changing motivations of 
business managers as early as 1914. Keynes made similar claims a few years later. There 
was, he argued, an inevitable tendency for ‘joint stock institutions, when they [had] reached 
a certain age and size, to approximate to the status of public corporations rather than that 
of individualistic private enterprise’. Big business tended to ‘socialise itself’ when ‘the owners 
of the capital’, meaning shareholders, became ‘almost entirely disassociated from the 
management’. At this point managers became more concerned with stability and reputation 
than with profit maximization, and shareholders had to satisfy themselves with 
‘conventionally adequate dividends’. It was on this basis that Keynes dismissed the need for 
nationalization. ‘The battle of socialism against unlimited private profit’, he argued, was 
‘being won in detail, hour by hour’ from within these large enterprises.51 Similar ideas 
                                                 
48 Thorstein Veblen, Theory of Business Enterprise (Scribner, 1904): see especially 77–8, 80. 
49 Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership (Huebsch, 1923), 231-2. 
50 Gerard Dumenil & Dominique Levy, Capital Resurgent (Harvard UP, 2004). 
51 J M Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (Hogarth Press, 1926)). 
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surfaced again in the early 1930s in the celebrated debate between Merrick Dodd and Adolf 
Berle. Dodd argued that the great majority of corporate shareholders bore little resemblance 
to traditional owners and that corporations increasingly resembled social institutions.  
Directors not only should be required to take account of the interests of employees, 
consumers, creditors and society as a whole as well as of shareholders, they were doing so 
as a matter of fact. This, he suggested, was perfectly defensible if you took seriously the 
existence of the corporation as a separate legal person.52  
 
By this time, the likening of shareholders to creditors and was becoming increasingly 
common, figuring prominently in the work of RH Tawney and Harold Laski in the UK53, and 
the work of Thorstein Veblen in the US.54 It also appeared in Berle and Means’ The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. Berle and Means recognised that the character of the 
shareholder and the corporation had radically changed. The rise of the modern corporation, 
they argued, had ‘dissolved the [private] property atom’ in which possession and control were 
united. There were now two forms of property: one active, the tangible assets owned by the 
corporation and controlled by the managers; the other passive, the intangible revenue rights, 
‘liquid, impersonal, and involving no responsibility’, owned by the shareholders. With 
shareholders now ‘not dissimilar in kind from bondholders or lenders of money’, it was no 
longer appropriate to view them as ‘owners’ of the corporation. This raised crucial ‘legal, 
economic and social questions’, the ‘greatest’ of which was ‘in whose interests should the 
great quasi-public corporations …be operated?’ The answer they seemed to favour involved 
recognizing that shareholders had ‘surrendered the right that the corporation should be 
operated in their sole interest’ and ‘released the community from the obligation to protect them 
to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights’. The community was now 
entitled ‘to demand that the modern corporation serve ... all society’ and that various groups 
be ‘assign[ed] ... a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private 
cupidity’; shareholders should get only ‘a fair return’ on their capital. It followed that the idea of 
the corporation as a private enterprise should be replaced by a ‘new concept of the corporation’ 
as a social institution.55 It was only because we didn’t yet have the institutional know-how to 
impose this broader ‘scheme of responsibilities’ on managers that Berle, contra Dodd, 
supported shareholder primacy as the only currently available way of making managers 
accountable.56  
 
By the 1950s, however, Berle was conceding that history had proved Dodd right: modern 
directors were acting not as pure profit-maximisers but as ’administrators of a community 
system’.57 This belief was a central tenet of the of so-called ‘managerialist’ theories of the 
firm that emerged after the Second World War. Premised on the de facto disempowerment 
of corporate shareholders and growing autonomy of professional managers, managerialist 
ideas about the corporation underpinned the belief, prevalent during the halcyon years of 
                                                 
52 See E Merrick Dodd, “For whom are corporate managers trustees?” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1147. 
53 R H Tawney,The Acquisitive Society (1920); H Laski, A Grammar of Politics (Allen & Unwin, 1925).  
54 Veblen, note 49, 231-2. 
55 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, Macmillan, 1932), 
especially Book IV. 
56 Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees’(1932), 45 Harvard Law Review,1365. 
57 Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (1954, UK edition  Macmillan, 1955), p137; Foreward 
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social democracy, that capitalism was gradually and inexorably being socialised, 
notwithstanding the continued possession by shareholders of residual control rights. During 
this period proposals to change corporate rights structures to reflect these perceived new 
realities were commonplace. Thus some argued for an attenuation of the rights of 
shareholders and their formal relegation to the status of creditors58; others argued for worker 
participation and industrial democracy. However, significant changes to corporate rights-
obligations structures did not materialise, in part because many on the left did not think them 
necessary. With organized labour strong, shareholders dispersed and weakened, controls 
on capital movements in place, finance seemed to have been tamed. Managers were not 
only in charge but subject to social controls and influences. The ‘managerial revolution’, it 
was thought, had ushered in socially responsible corporations and a new ‘softer’, socialised 
capitalism. 
 
Organised Money: Exploiting Shareholder Residual Proprietary Rights59 
This, it turned out, was mistaken. With the residual proprietary rights attached to shares still 
intact, the landscape began to change once more. The bundle of rights and power 
possessed by shareholders was gradually enhanced by the relaxation of the rules regulating 
the free movement of capital (the demise of Bretton Woods) and rise of global financial 
markets, by the modification of the rules on take-overs, by the emergence of new 
mechanisms of investor protection and by the waning power of organized labour. At the 
same time, the ownership of shares and other forms of financial property gradually re-
concentrated in financial institutions – within which competition between portfolio managers 
subject to regular market-based performance evaluation has steadily grown. New types of 
financial institution, like hedge funds and private equity firms, also emerged. As a result 
shareholders, in their new institutional guises, have been increasingly able to use the 
residual proprietary rights attached to shares to (re)assert their power in and over 
corporations, shaping (and in some cases directing) the behaviour of executives. This power 
is exerted both directly in individual companies and indirectly on the corporate sector as a 
whole through financial markets. Indeed, the latter has rendered financial power ubiquitous. 
‘Even the largest global firms’, writes Grahame Thompson, ‘can be stalked by activist 
investors – hunted by private equity or sovereign wealth funds seeking added shareholder 
value extraction … Few companies, however large or internationalised, are immune from 
the threat of takeover’.60 This has propelled us back to a finance-capital-dominated world. 
The changes in managerial behaviour have not, however, been a matter only of externally 
imposed market imperatives. Modern forms of executive remuneration aligning the interests 
of managers and shareholders have made the ruthless pursuit of ‘shareholder value’ very 
lucrative for executives: since the 1990s their pay has sky-rocketed. Financialization has 
been further intensified by financial institutions seeking the rapid capital gains available from 
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rising share values rather than steady revenue streams. The result has been the emergence 
of brutally short-termist, financialized forms of governance which show little concern for the 
long-term productive health of corporations, let alone for the interests of employees, 
communities or the environment. Indeed, on occasions governance has descended into 
blatant looting and asset-stripping. The corporate legal form as currently constituted has 
made these forms of governance possible. The residual proprietary rights and creditors’ 
privileges attached to shares have enabled short-term financial gain to be ruthlessly pursued 
without regard to, and without any sense of responsibility for, the long-term health of firms, 
let alone the economic, social, and environmental costs. Responsibility for dealing with any 
deleterious consequences (whether financial crises, railway accidents, lost jobs, lower 
wages, damaged communities, growing inequality or environmental degradation) has fallen 
on the state – states whose ability to raise taxes to deal with these ‘externalities’ has been 
undermined by these very modes of governance.61 The great financial crash, in which the 
costs were socialized but not the guilty corporations, provided a stark illustration of this.  
In recent years the most extreme examples of financialized governance have been 
associated with Private Equity firms. 62  Eileen Applebaum and Rosemary Batt’s 
comprehensive study of PE in the US makes it clear that the cases in which PE firms provide 
the investment and management expertise needed to help turn companies around or grow 
are exceptional. The norm is for PE firms, making extensive use of debt and leverage, to 
seek quick capital gains by engineering financial deteriorations in the balance sheets of 
companies to force through radical cost-cutting measures entailing job losses, greater 
precarity, cuts to pay and social benefits (like pensions), poorer working conditions, and so 
on.63 Not only do their activities frequently have negative impacts on the workforce (which 
is seen as disposable or substitutable) and on communities, they often damage the long-
term productive health of enterprises without always delivering the claimed returns to the 
limited (as opposed to the general) partners.64  Crucially, although practices vary between 
countries and although these firms represent only a small proportion of the institutional 
market, the aggressive and highly financialized approach of Anglo-Saxon PE is not only 
spreading but has begun to influence the practices of corporations themselves. PE firms, 
argues Julie Froud, have acted as ‘pioneers who have developed and tested out forms of 
financial and workforce engineering that have increasingly been normalized by public 
corporations’ (such as the use of high levels of debt and tax arbitrage). There has, she says, 
been ‘a kind of convergence of behaviour of organized money’, through which the ‘cynical 
financialized behaviour’ of financial intermediaries has come to ‘play an increasingly 
important role in shaping economic activity and social life’.65  
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Defending Shareholder Residual Proprietary Rights 
The radical reassertion of the principle of shareholder primacy has, of course, been 
controversial, prompting in recent decades the development of new justifications which rely 
less on problematic assertions of shareholder corporate ownership and more on its alleged 
‘efficiency’ benefits. Claims of this sort underpinned the nexus-of-contracts theories of the 
corporation which rose to prominence in the 1980s. These theories represent the academic 
apotheosis of corporate schizophrenia, in some contexts vigorously asserting the reality of 
the separate corporate person, in others conceptualizing the corporation out of existence. 
Thus Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel begin their well-known exposition of contractual 
theory by curtly dismissing the idea of the corporation as a ‘legal fiction’, a matter of 
‘convenience rather than reality’. With the corporation out of the way, nothing stands 
between the shareholders and the corporate assets and the directors, enabling them to 
depict corporate governance as a simple ‘agency problem’: how do you get agent-directors 
to act in the interests of shareholder-principals? On the other hand, when defending limited 
liability - which they describe as ‘perhaps the distinguishing feature of corporate law‘- 
Easterbrook and Fischel are forced hastily to resurrect the (fictional) corporate entity. 
‘Corporations’, they tell us, ‘do not have limited liability; they must pay all of their debts, just 
as anyone else must’.66 The separate existence of the corporation is thus very seriously in 
one context, but completely ignored in another.  
 
The defenders of shareholder primacy are generally aware, however, that no matter how 
theoretically sophisticated, consequentialist defences of shareholder rights do not have 
quite the same persuasive power as defences based on notions of ownership. As a result, 
assertions of (or assumptions about) shareholder corporate ‘ownership’ persist not only in 
everyday consciousness, as the Railtrack cases show, but in the academic literature. 
Historically, the credibility of these assertions has been bolstered by the proliferation of 
private and subsidiary companies. As we have seen, the Companies Act 1844-62 and the 
corporate legal form were not designed for use by small firms not organized on a joint stock 
basis. However, the closing decades of the nineteenth century saw more and more such 
firms incorporate to get limited liability. Many doubted the legitimacy and legality of this 
practice but it was validated by the House of Lords in the celebrated case of Salomon v. 
Salomon & Co Ltd.  Most significant business enterprises were soon incorporating, whatever 
their economic natures67, with the result that the radical conceptual separation of companies 
and shareholders, developed in the specific context of JSCs populated by large numbers of 
passive rentier shareholders, was extended to ‘private’ companies that were, in reality, 
nothing more than incorporated individual proprietorships and partnerships. Crucially, in 
these firms, there was usually a clear controlling individual or group operating much like an 
‘owner’ in the traditional sense of the word, albeit, of course, with limited (or no-) liability.  
 
Equally importantly, when corporate groups began to emerge the Salomon principle was 
formalistically extended to them. Today the economically most powerful firms are 
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multinational enterprises composed of groups of companies connected through 
shareholding, each of which is regarded in law as a formally separate entity, although in 
most cases the organisation as a whole is co-ordinated by a single management team. The 
liability shields made possible by such groups has, of course facilitated irresponsible 
behaviour. These enterprises can, for example, choose where to locate their activities and 
profits, pushing investment-seeking states into competing to create favourable legal, 
regulatory and tax environments.68 The existence of subsidiary companies of this sort has 
also fuelled the idea of shareholder ownership by creating companies where there is a 
controlling shareholder who looks and acts like an ‘owner’ in the traditional sense.  
 
Indeed, ownership claims loom large in defences of shareholder primacy in other ways too. 
With the growth in private pensions, share ownership has ceased to be the preserve of the 
wealthy and trickled down (indirectly) to ordinary people. This underpins arguments that 
share ownership has been ‘democratised’ and that shareholder primacy not only indirectly 
benefits us all by ensuring productive efficiency but directly benefits a growing number of us 
in our capacity as share-owners. However, although ownership of shares and other forms 
of financial property has indeed spread, it has also become increasingly concentrated 
amongst the very wealthy.69 In the US since 1970, for example, the proportion of ‘wealth’ or 
‘capital’ owned by the top 10% has risen from just over 60% to over 70%, and the proportion 
owned by the top 1% has risen from under 30% to over 35%. The levels of concentration 
are not quite as high in Europe but the pattern is similar. Income inequality has also 
increased, driven in part by the growth in ‘supersalaries’, the enormously high incomes going 
to corporate executives and the ‘supermanagers’ of ‘other people’s money’.70 The result has 
been the emergence of a politically powerful alliance between the very wealthy, the 
managers of their money, the executive managerial class, and what Jeffrey Winters has 
called the ‘agents of wealth defence’ - the army of skilled professionals (lawyers, 
accountants and the like) employed by the wealthy to protect their incomes.71 This ‘new 
aristocracy of finance’ has been the real beneficiary of the vigorous reassertion of 
shareholder primacy and emergence of increasingly financialized corporate governance. 
 
Realising the Potential of the Corporation 
In recent years, interest in alternative business forms – alternative to the traditional, profit- 
and shareholder-oriented corporation – has been growing. And quite rightly so. The 
standard for-profit public corporation, as currently constituted, is not merely not serving 
society well, it is heavily implicated in the increasing dysfunctionality of contemporary 
financialized capitalism. In this context, experimentation with alternative, more socially 
responsible and sensitive, more environmentally-friendly, and more participatory and 
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democratic organizational forms is urgently needed. At present, however, a significant 
proportion of society’s productive resources remain either under the direct or indirect control 
of public corporations. Social transformation will, therefore, require not only experimentation 
with alternative, more ‘socialised’ organizational forms, but radical reform of the corporations 
whose activities dominate the economic landscape.  
 
We should not be surprised by the growth of corporate social irresponsibility. As we have 
seen, the JSC was from its inception a vehicle not only for productive activity but for rentier 
investment, and the construction in the nineteenth century of the corporate legal form was 
shaped above all else by the needs and interests of rentier investors. One manifestation of 
this was the (re-)constitution of the share as a legal hybrid combining some of the residual 
‘insider’ rights of owners with the ‘outsider’ privileges of creditors. This hybridity 
foreshadowed very different possible futures. Historically, in the US and the UK corporate 
governance has been shaped in significant part by the ability (or otherwise) of shareholders, 
in their many and changing guises, to utilise and exploit their residual proprietary rights to 
influence the behaviour of corporate executives. Put simply, when shareholders have been 
unable (or disinclined) to use their residual ownership rights in an effective manner, the 
ruthless logic of capital accumulation, with its lack of concern with social costs and 
consequences (‘externalities’), has been tempered (though not eliminated), making possible 
less shareholder-oriented, financially-driven and socially damaging forms of governance. By 
contrast, when shareholders have been able and willing to assert their residual proprietary 
rights, the strict logic of capital has been re-imposed and governance become more 
‘financialized’ and socially irresponsible. Given the nature of corporate shareholding, we 
should not be surprised that in the context of a corporate legal form which couples no-liability 
(and no moral responsibility) shareholding with control rights, the re-concentration of 
shareholding in institutions, rise of increasingly open and global financial markets, and 
reassertion by shareholders of their residual proprietary rights have seen the emergence of 
radically re-financialized and socially irresponsible forms of governance.  
 
The financial crash of 2007-08 has seen the re-emergence of debates about the nature and 
purpose of the corporation and renewed questioning of the neoliberal corporate governance 
orthodoxies of the 1990s. Attacks on the idea of shareholder value, encapsulated 
academically by Lynn Stout’s The Shareholder Value Myth72, extend to the business world, 
exemplified by Jack Welch’s assertion that it was ‘the dumbest idea in the world’.73 The 
‘mess’ we have made of corporate governance, the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf recently 
argued, ‘has a name: it is shareholder value maximisation’. 74  These critiques do not, 
however, generally entail a rejection of shareholder primacy. On the contrary, their goal is 
usually to get managers to pursue shareholder value in a more ‘enlightened’ manner and to 
focus on long- rather than short-term financial returns. Many of the reform proposals that 
have emerged thus seek to get shareholders to act more like ‘proper’, active, committed 
‘owners’, (often by re-empowering them with enhanced proprietorial rights) and to persuade 
managers to adopt the role of ‘stewards’. Thus Colin Mayer, implicitly recognising the 
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problem of corporate schizophrenia, seeks to supplement the traditional emphasis on 
‘incentives, ownership and control’ with an emphasis on ‘obligations, responsibilities and 
commitment’, proposing inter alia that voting rights be withheld from shareholders until they 
have demonstrated their ‘ownership’ credentials and held their shares for a minimum 
period.75   
 
What is missing here is recognition that the great majority of corporate shareholding is 
inherently passive and financially motivated, and that the increasing mediation of share 
ownership by institutions acting as the ‘general managers’ of ‘all lenders of money’ has 
intensified this financial focus. Trying to get no-liability, no-responsibility, rentier 
shareholders and their representatives to act more like owners is rather like trying to get 
cats to bark. Portfolio investment discourages not only shareholder involvement and 
responsibility, but careful monitoring of risk. It positively encourages financialization. In this 
institutional context, reforms aimed at empowering and enhancing the proprietorial rights of 
rentier shareholders and at making them more active, whether in financial markets or in 
corporations, are, therefore, more likely to exacerbate the problem than to solve it. 76 
Although proposals such as Mayer’s for time-dependent voting rights are, then, steps in the 
right direction and highlight the urgent need to reform corporate rights-obligation structures, 
it has to be questioned whether they go far enough. They don’t address the underlying 
problem: the Janus-faced, hybrid nature of corporate shareholding and the schizophrenic 
treatment of the corporation as ‘completely separate’ from its shareholders for some 
purposes and as an object of property ‘owned’ by them for others. As the Railtrack cases 
confirm, the ‘contractual right [of shareholders] to receive profit on a residual basis … along 
with rights to elect and remove directors ... appears to suggest to some that shareholders 
remain the ‘real owners’ of the business and therefore ought to enjoy that status whenever 
it suits their purposes’. It also ‘constitutes a direct rejection of the entity status of the 
corporation’, upon which, of course, in other (liability) contexts, shareholders rely.77  
 
With money capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small elite and managed 
by powerful financial institutions, this is a toxic mix. By mixing ‘insider’ with ‘outsider’ rights 
and combining no-liability rentier shareholding with control rights, our rights-obligations 
structures have become a recipe not only for short-termist financialized governance, but for 
managerial excess, corporate rapacity and irresponsibility, for the increasing exploitation of 
labour by capital, and for growing inequality. The problem is not merely one of ‘commitment’ 
- the members of RPSAG were long-term, committed shareholders - but of responsibility. 
There is, then, an urgent need to reconsider the Janus-faced, hybrid nature of corporate 
shareholding and to take separate corporate personhood seriously. This might enable us to 
tap the ‘yet unrealized potential of the corporation’.78 Radical reform of corporate rights-
obligations structures will require us to dispel the myth of shareholder ownership and the 
ideological and intellectual barriers to this are considerable. When Lynn Stout discussed her 
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book recently, she reported that ‘the interviewer simply couldn’t get his mind around [her] 
claim that shareholders aren’t really ‘owners’’.79  
 
The political obstacles to reform are, of course, even greater. The enormous power and 
influence of the new financial oligarchy means that even modest reforms are likely to be 
vigorously resisted, as are the necessary shifts in understandings and consciousness. But 
there are some promising signs: the characterisation and treatment of shareholders as 
‘owners’ is once again actively and widely being questioned, and worker participation is 
beginning to re-emerge as a live issue. In this more open intellectual environment, the 
historical development of the corporate legal form and some of the old debates are worth 
revisiting, for they not only force us to question the hybrid status of corporate shareholders 
– ‘owed’ or ‘owning’?80 – but remind us just how contingent, complex and malleable are the 
institutions of property and ownership. The rights in the property bundle can be allocated 
and arranged in many different ways. Not everything has to be ‘owned’ in the full liberal 
sense; nor is it always better if they are. As Mayer says, ‘there is no natural order ... we can 
create concepts and institutions to assist rather than subjugate us’.81 The choice is not 
simply between private property and collective property.82  It is time we began to experiment 
with different rights-obligations structures and what Berle called new ‘schemes of 
responsibility’, and to address the problem of institutional know-how he identified all those 
years ago.  
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